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I. INTRODUCTION
"[H]onesty has no fence against superior cunning; and since it is nec-
essary that there should be a perpetual intercourse of buying and sell-
ing, and dealing upon credit, where fraud is permitted and connived
at, or has no law to punish it, the honest dealer is always undone, and
the knave gets the advantage."'
The recent London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) scandal of
manipulating interest rates on a global basis has, yet again, called into
question issues of stability and moral integrity of the global financial
services sector and, in particular, systemic banks, 2 which form the
panels that submit the data LIBOR rates are based upon. LIBOR
manipulation is being described as nothing less than a cartel of banks 3
manipulating interest rates that affect hundreds of trillions of dollars
in financial products, including adjustable rate mortgages, credit cards,
interest rate swaps, and interest rates on government bailout funds.4
Perhaps most troubling is something rarely, if ever, mentioned; that
the LIBOR manipulation also undermines the reliability of the United
States Treasury stress tests and Dodd-Frank reporting requirements,
which require LIBOR data and other data provided by some of the
same banks that manipulated LIBOR data.5 This perverse situation
1. JONATHAN Swwr, THE WORKS OF JONATHAN Swn'r: GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 44-45 (Black's
Readers Serv. Co. 1932) (1726) (emphasis added).
2. A systemic financial-service institution is defined as a commercial and/or investment bank
that poses a risk to the domestic economy if it fails due to the sum of its assets, leverage, and
counterparty risk exceeding about 15.2% of the GDP plus banking assets. Sharon E. Foster,
Systemic Financial-Service Institutions and Monopoly Power, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 357, 374
(2011).
3. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & D. Daniel Sokol, The Lessons from LIBOR for Detection and
Deterrence of Cartel Wrongdoing, 3 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 10 (2012); Ellen Brown, Titanic Banks
Hit Libor'berg, ASIA TIMES (July 24, 2012), www.atimes.com/atimes/Global-Economy/
NG24Dj01.html; Hammer Time: How Auction Theory Can Help Improve the System for Setting
LIBOR, THE ECONOMIST (July 14, 2012), www.economist.com/node/21558573; Alan Kohler,
Banking Is a Cartel Where Prices Are Fixed Twice, ABC (July 5, 2012, 12:38 PM), www.
abc.net.au/news/2012-07-05/kohler-banking-is-a-cartel/4111782. But see Andreas Stephan,
Should LIBOR-Rigging Be Treated Like Price Fixing?, COMPETITION POLICY BLOG (July 11,
2012), www.competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2012/07/11/should-libor-rigging-be-treated-like-
price-fixing.
4. Alexandra Alper & Kirstin Ridley, Barclays Paying $453 Million to Settle LIBOR Probe,
REUTERS (June 27, 2012, 6:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-barclays-libor-
idUSBRE85Q0J720120627; David M. Ellis, LIBOR Manipulation: A Brief Overview of the De-
bate, FTI CONSULTING (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.fticonsulting.com/global2/media/collaterall
united-states/libor-manipulation.pdf; Pam Martens, LIBOR Scandal Made Simple: It's About Il-
legal Proprietary Trading, WALL ST. ON PARADE (July 18, 2012), http://wallstreetonparade.com/
2012/07/libor-scandal-made-sim.
5. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND
REVIEw 2012: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS FOR STRESS SCENARIO PROJECTIONS 8 (Mar. 13,
2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/presslbcreg/bcreg2Ol2O3l3al.pdf.
Income projection and losses are based on the same interest-rate-sensitive financial products as
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places the public in the unacceptable position of having to rely on the
unreliable.
This is not the first scandal to raise issues about the stability and
integrity of the financial services sector nor will it be the last. Since
the financial crisis started in 2007, we have learned that systemic
banks have participated in bid rigging on public works of improve-
ments, 6 money laundering violating United States sanctions on Iran,7
mortgage fraud,8 and various other fraudulent endeavors. 9 And, as
before, there are cries for investigations and regulatory reform.10 Cer-
tainly, United States antitrust law already addresses the alleged cartel
conduct on both civil and criminal grounds. While civil antitrust ac-
tions based upon section 1 of the Sherman Act (Section 1) have al-
ready been filed," historical patterns seem to suggest that no
significant criminal cases will be brought against the systemic banks
nor their upper management. 12 This Article addresses the applicabil-
ity of Section 1 to the LIBOR manipulation facts as set forth in the
Barclays Settlement documents. 13
those that are affected by LIBOR such as credit cards, mortgages, municipal bonds, and deriva-
tives. Id. at 13-16, 18, 32-36, 40, 44-54. Additionally, as with LIBOR data, the input data for
the stress test projections is provided by the banks being tested. Id. at 17.
6. Hinds Cnty. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. (In re Mun. Derivatives Antitrust Litig.), 620 F. Supp.
2d 499, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
7. Liz Rappaport, Banks Settle Iran Money Case, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2012, 10:28 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444777589380427559426.html.
8. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2010 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT: YEAR IN REVIEW
(2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud-2010.
9. See House of Commons Treasury Committee, Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence, at
42 (U.K. July 4, 2012) (to be published as HC 481-i) [hereinafter HC 481-i], available at http://
www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/treasury/treasury committee_04-july_12
bobdiamond.pdf; see also 158 CONG. REC. S5921-22 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Sherrod Brown).
10. 158 CONG. REC. E1362 (daily ed. July 31, 2012) (statement of Rep. Earl Blumenauer); 158
CONG. REc. E1333 (daily ed. July 24, 2012) (statement of Sen. Mazie K. Hirono); MARTIN
WHEATLEY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 35 (HM Treasury, U.K., Sept.
28, 2012), available at http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley reviewlibor-finalreport_280912.
pdf; Final Communiqui: Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, G2012
MEXICO (Nov. 4-5, 2012), http://www.g20mexico.org/index.phplen/press-releases/537-final-
communique.
11. See Amended Complaint at 13, In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 2012
WL 1522305 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 2262, 11 Civ. 2613); see also Complaint, Adams v. Bank of
Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-07461-UA (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012).
12. None to date. Indeed, it seems none are likely not due to a lack of evidence but rather
due to a concern of the economic fallout if such prosecutions went forward. Lanny A. Breuer,
Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Speech at the New York City Bar Association
(Sept. 13, 2012), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131.
html.
13. See In re Barclays PLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 32,234, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39 (June
27, 2012); Letter from U.K. Fin. Servs. Auth., Final Notice to Barclays Bank PLC (June 27, 2012)
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Part II of this Article explains the LIBOR interest rate benchmarks,
how they are calculated, and how banks are selected to be on a LI-
BOR panel, thus placing a bank in the position to manipulate interest
rates. Additionally, this part explains the history of the adoption of
LIBOR rates as benchmarks and why properly functioning interest
rate benchmarks are critical to a properly functioning market. Finally,
this part examines what happened with the LIBOR manipulation pri-
marily based on the Barclays Settlement during the summer of 2012
with the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom,
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), and the United States
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The Barclays Set-
tlement documents regarding LIBOR manipulation and EURIBOR
manipulation (another interest rate benchmark) are nothing less than
shocking.14 Adjustable interest rates were raised and lowered by
these banks for personal gain and public deception.
In Part III, Section 1 is examined in relation to the LIBOR manipu-
lation. Generally, Section 1 deals with cartels and requires an agree-
ment between two or more persons in unreasonable restraint of trade.
The Barclays Settlement documents reference numerous emails indi-
cating agreements to manipulate LIBOR rates, which would amount
to price fixing-an unreasonable restraint of trade. The main problem
under Section 1 is that many, though not all, of these emails were
intra-firm-between Barclays Capital Traders and LIBOR submitters
at Barclays Bank, a sister corporation, and Barclays PLC, the parent
corporation which wholly owns Barclays Capital and Barclays Bank.15
In order to have two persons for an agreement under Section 1, two
separate economic actors are required. Generally, a parent corpora-
tion and its wholly owned subsidiary are considered one economic ac-
[hereinafter Final Notice to Barclays], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/bar
clays-junl2.pdf; Statement of Facts, Non-Prosecution Agreement Between U.S. Dep't of Justice
and Barclays Bank PLC (June 26, 2012) [hereinafter Statement of Facts], available at http://www.
justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9312012710173426365941.pdf.
14. UBS has recently entered into similar settlements regarding its participation in LIBOR
manipulation. See In re UBS AG, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 32,481, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 80
(Dec. 19, 2012); Letter from U.K. Fin. Servs. Auth., Final Notice to UBS AG (Dec. 19, 2012)
[hereinafter Final Notice to UBS], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/finallubs.pdf;
Statement of Facts, Non-Prosecution Agreement Between U.S. Dep't of Justice and UBS AG
(Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/6942012121911725320624.
pdf. The total UBS settlement with these three regulators for its part in the LIBOR manipula-
tion, and manipulation of other interest rate benchmarks such as EURIBOR, is reported at $1.5
billion. David Enrich & Jean Eaglesham, UBS Admits Rigging Rates in 'Epic' Plot, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 20, 2012, 7:17 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873244075045781883 4 261
8724274.html.
15. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *11-12.
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tor as are sister subsidiaries. 16 However, as discussed in Part III, the
Barclays Settlement evidences a lack of unity of economic interests as
well as a lack of control of the parent corporation over the subsidiar-
ies. Accordingly, it is possible under these circumstances that we are
dealing with more than one economic actor.
After the LIBOR manipulation and Barclays Settlement became
public in the summer of 2012, some regulatory officials and commen-
tators suggested that no one was damaged as a result of the LIBOR
manipulation.17 Conversely, some expect that the civil damages could
run into the billions of dollars.' 8 Part IV discusses the damage re-
quirement for Section 1 civil claims and the intent requirement for
Section 1 criminal actions. Again, the Barclays Settlement documents
are analyzed together with civil and criminal Section 1 cases to estab-
lish damages or intent.
Perhaps in an attempt to down play the significance of the LIBOR
manipulation, it has been claimed that governmental regulators were
complicit in the manipulation at least from the start of the financial
crisis in 2008.19 Allegedly, regulators wanted systemic banks like Bar-
clays to artificially report low LIBOR rates to deceive the public into
thinking certain systemic banks were financially stable. Low LIBOR
rates mean a bank can borrow at a low rate because it is a low credit
risk, indicating that the bank is stable. Part V explains why it is irrele-
vant under a Section 1 claim that regulators may have advocated, en-
couraged or suggested such conduct.
Finally, Part VI looks at the extraterritorial application of Section 1
in this global cartel context. The Barclays group is a United Kingdom
16. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Hood v. Tenneco
Tex. Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Copperweld to sister subsidiaries of
the same parent).
17. Jim Puzzanghera, Geithner Doubts Libor Manipulation Cost Taxpayers Bailout Money,
L.A. TIMES (July 27, 2012), http://articles.1atimes.com/2012/jul/27/business/la-fi-geithner-hearing-
20120727 (describing Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner's testimony before a Senate panel,
defending his handling of concerns in 2008 that large banks were manipulating Libor); see Daniel
J. Macy, Funds Suits over Alleged LIBOR Manipulation Garner More Attention as Scandal
Grows, THOMPSON INFO. SERVICES (July 27, 2012), http://www.thompson.com/public/newsbrief.
jsp?cat=FINANCE&id=3906. For the difficulty in establishing LIBOR manipulation damages,
see James Kavanagh & Reinder Van Dijk, LIBOR Damages: Key Emerging Issues (Oct. 17,
2012), http://www.cdr-news.com/categories/expert-views/libor-damages:-key-emerging-issues.
18. See Satyajit Das, The Libor Fix-Part 2, ECONOMONITOR (July 24, 2012) [hereinafter Das,
Part 2], http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2Ol2/07/the-libor-fix-part-2/; Satyajit Das, The LI-
BOR Fix-Part 1, ECoNOMONITOR (July 23, 2012) [hereinafter Das, Part 1], http://www.
economonitor.com/blog/2012/07/the-libor-fix-part-1/; Maureen Kraten & Michael Kraten, Libor
Manipulation: Calculating Damages, AQPQ (July 16, 2012), http://aqpq.org/2012/07/16/libor-ma
nipulation-calculating-damages/.
19. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *22-64; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note
13, 11 12-14, 102-45; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 15-22.
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banking group, and much of the antitrust activity took place in
London, England. But that activity caused an effect in the United
States justifying the extraterritorial application of United States anti-
trust laws. However, United States banks are also implicated in the
LIBOR manipulation and may be subject to competition laws of other
countries on similar, extraterritorial grounds.
II. WHAT Is LIBOR?
LIBOR is an estimate of interest rates one bank would pay to bor-
row unsecured funding from another bank.20 In essence, it reflects the
estimated cost of money. Specifically, the British Bankers Associa-
tion, which administered LIBOR from its inception and through the
relevant time period,21 would have participating banks submit data in
response to this question, "At what rate could you borrow funds, were
you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a
reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?"22 The rates are calculated
by participating banks submitting data on a daily basis reflecting their
estimated cost of money for fifteen different time periods; overnight
loans up to twelve month loans.23 Participating banks are on panels
consisting of six to eighteen banks with some banks on more than one
panel.2 4 There are a total of ten panels; one for each of the ten major
currencies 25 included in the LIBOR calculations. 26
Banks are selected as participating banks on the panels based upon
reputation, credit quality, and activity in London, as London is a ma-
jor international financial market.27 The data provided by participat-
20. Alvin L. Arnold, Financing: Understanding Libor, 44 No. 6 MORTGAGE & REAL EsT.
EXECUTIVEs REP. 6 (2011); Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 9 30-32; BANK OF ENG.,
TRENDS IN LENDING 14 (2012), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Docu
ments/other/monetary/trendsJulyl2.pdf; The Basics, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/
bbalibor-explained/the-basics (last visited May 16, 2013).
21. WHEATLEY, supra note 10, at 5.
22. The Basics, supra note 20.
23. Id.: see also Arnold, supra note 20, at 6; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 9 30-32.
24. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 1 34; The Basics, supra note 20.
25. These currencies include the Australian Dollar, the Canadian Dollar, the Swiss Franc, the
Danish Krone, the Euro, the British Pound Sterling, the Japanese Yen, the New Zealand Dollar,
the Swedish Krona, and the U.S. Dollar. See The Basics, supra note 20.
26. Id. With ten panels providing data for fifteen time periods, a total of 150 interest rates are
calculated under LIBOR. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 1 34.
27. The Basics, supra note 20. Participating banks are selected twice yearly by the Foreign
Exchange and Money Markets Committee-a committee comprised of anonymous market par-
ticipants, meeting in undisclosed locations to discuss LIBOR panel participation in strictly confi-
dential terms. Id.; Liam Vaughan, Secret Libor Committee Clings to Anonymity Following
Scandal. BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2012, 7:53 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-20/
secret-libor-committee-clings-to-anonymity-after-rigging-scandal.html. Banks currently on LI-
BOR panels include: Abbey National plc; Bank of America; Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ
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ing banks on a specific panel is then "trimmed" with the highest and
lowest 25% rates eliminated and the median rates used.28 For exam-
ple, the U.S. Dollar LIBOR panel is comprised of eighteen participat-
ing banks which would submit data each day on each of the fifteen
time periods. Looking at just one of those time periods for purposes
of this example, say the overnight rate, of the eighteen data submis-
sions, the high four and the low four would be eliminated with the
middle remaining ten used to calculate the overnight interest rate for
the U.S. Dollar LIBOR.29
A. Why LIBOR Matters
Prior to the ubiquitous use of LIBOR as an interest rate bench-
mark, other benchmarks were used more frequently like the Prime
Rate based upon the Federal Reserve's Discount Rate in the United
States, which is the rate of interest the Federal Reserve charges banks
to borrow funds.30 However, during the economic instability of the
1970s, inflation caused unacceptable fluctuations in interest rates cre-
ating concern about the stability and predictability of a central bank
benchmark for interest rates, such as the Federal Reserve's rate in the
United States. 31 Additionally, questions were raised about the use of
a regulator's (again like the Federal Reserve, which is a banking regu-
lator in the United States) interest rates for benchmarks with respect
to whether it truly reflected market conditions or, rather, reflected
political policy. 32 Further, this economic instability caused concern
about long-term debt being set at a fixed rate resulting in market mis-
match; basically the cost of money to a bank as a debtor being higher
than the interest rates charged by a bank, as a creditor, to its custom-
Ltd.; Bank of Nova Scotia; Barclays Bank plc; BNP Paribas; Canadian Imperial Bank of Com-
merce; Citibank N.A.; Commonwealth Bank of Australia; Credit Agricole CIB; Credit Suisse;
Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC; JP Morgan Chase; Lloyds Banking Group; Mizuho Corporate Bank;
Rabobank; Royal Bank of Canada; Socidtd G6ndrale; Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp.;
Norinchukin Bank; Royal Bank of Scotland Group; and UBS AG. Many of these banks are on
more than one panel. In re Barclays PLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 32,234, 2012 CFTC
LEXIS 39, at *13-15 (June 27, 2012); The Basics, supra note 20.
28. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 36; The Basics, supra note 20; see Arnold, supra
note 20, at 6.
29. The Basics, supra note 20.
30. FEDPRIMERATE.COM, http://www.fedprimerate.com/ (last visited May 16, 2013); The Dis-
count Rate, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetary
policy/discountrate.htm (last visited May 16, 2013).
31. Jacob Gyntelberg & Philip Wooldridge, Interbank Rate Fixings During the Recent Turmoil,
BIS Q. REv., March 2008, at 59, 59-60.
32. Id. at 60-63.
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ers.33 These concerns fueled the desire for a more predictable, stable
interest rate benchmark as well as a change from fixed rates of inter-
est to variable rates tied to an interest rate benchmark. 34 Finally, the
1980s saw an increase in "creative" financial products, such as interest
rate sensitive derivatives like interest rate swaps, many of which are
tied directly or indirectly to an interest rate benchmark. In part, as a
response to many of these events, LIBOR was created in 1986.35
LIBOR rates are a benchmark for interest rates on a global scale.36
A benchmark for interest rates needs to be predictable, stable, and
reflect market fundamentals37 because a properly functioning bench-
mark in financial markets is critical to a properly functioning mar-
ket.38 As a benchmark for interest rates, LIBOR provides data which
is then used to calculate interest rates for a wide variety of financial
products.39 Globally, there are approximately $750 trillion in financial
products.40 Of that $750 trillion, approximately $560 trillion directly
reference LIBOR rates,41 which is about a 75% market share. These
financial products include things such as adjustable-rate mortgages,
auto loans, credit cards, and interest rate derivative contracts.42 Addi-
tionally, LIBOR is an indicator of the financial stability of the major
banks in the world;43 the higher interest rate a bank has to pay indi-
33. See generally LIBOR (Barclays Interest Rate Manipulation Case), N.Y. TIMEs, http://top
ics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/1llondon-interbank-offered_rate_1ibor/index.
html (last visited May 16, 2013).
34. The Basics, supra note 20.
35. Id.; LIBOR: Where Do We Go from Here?, BLACKROCK (July 2012), https://www2.black
rock.com/webcore/litService/search/getDocument.seam?venue=PUBIND&source=GLOBAL
&contentld=1111170360.
36. Gyntelberg & Wooldridge, supra note 31, at 59; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13,
1 3, 13; The Basics, supra note 20.
37. Gyntelberg & Wooldridge, supra note 31, at 60; The Basics, supra note 20.
38. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 6.
39. The Basics, supra note 20.
40. LIBOR (Barclays Interest Rate Manipulation Case), supra note 33. This amount has been
calculated as high as $800 trillion, 158 CONG. REc. S5959 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2012) (Statement of
Sen. Dick Durbin), and as low as about $360 trillion, Barclays Paying $453 Million to Settle
LIBOR Probe; CEO Quits, 18 No. 17 WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES 2 (2012). Part of the discrep-
ancy is a result of what is included in the figure-the broad "financial products" or specific
instruments such as loans.
41. Lauren Oppenheimer et al., Understanding LIBOR, THIRD WAY (Aug. 16, 2012), http://
content.thirdway.org/publications/570fThirdWayMemo_-.UnderstandingLibor.pdf.
42. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 91 3, 5; The Basics, supra note 20. Interest rate
derivative contracts are basically a hedge or insurance to reduce the risk of wide interest rate
swings and would include financial products such as interest rate swaps and exchange-traded
interest rate futures. See Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 1 38, 41-45; see also In re
Barclays PLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 32,234, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *12-15 (June 27,
2012).
43. The Basics, supra note 20.
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cates a perception that bank is at risk while a lower interest rate indi-
cates that a bank is less risky.44
Finally, interest rate sensitive financial products are part of the cal-
culation in the periodic stress test analysis to determine the financial
stability of systemic banks.45 To the extent these financial products
are tied to LIBOR, which is highly likely considering LIBOR's 75%
market share as a benchmark, the stress test results are compromised
by inaccurate LIBOR data. This result is an excellent example of the
classic statistical theory-garbage-in-garbage-out. 46
B. What Happened
Most of what we know comes from the first LIBOR Settlement be-
tween Barclays and the FSA in the United Kingdom, and the DOJ
and CFTC in the United States. 47 Additional facts regarding LIBOR
manipulation are constantly coming to light as it appears that Barclays
is just the first of many banks involved in the LIBOR manipulation
which will be settled to avoid, or at least limit the impact of, criminal
charges.48
Starting in or about 2005, some if not all of the participating banks
on various LIBOR panels manipulated the data submitted for the LI-
BOR rates.49 Generally speaking, this manipulation was both internal
and external. For example, the internal manipulation would occur
when a trader within a LIBOR panel bank or a wholly owned subsidi-
ary would request that the LIBOR data submitters for that bank sub-
mit data that would make the LIBOR rates go up or down depending
44. Arnold, supra note 20, at 6.
45. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., supra note 5, at 15-18, 36-37, 40, 47,
57.
46. Evidently a common practice of methodology among our financial services regulators. See
NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: AN INSIDE AccouNT OF How WASHINGTON ABANDONED MAIN
STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET 88-94, 196-98 (2012).
47. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFrC LEXIS 39; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13; State-
ment of Facts, supra note 13.
48. To date, UBS has also settled. In re UBS AG, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 32,481, 2012
CFTC LEXIS 80 (Dec. 19, 2012); Final Notice to UBS, supra note 14; Statement of Facts, Non-
Prosecution Agreement Between U.S. Dep't of Justice and UBS AG (Dec. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/6942012121911725320624.pdf. Other banks that appear
to be under scrutiny include JP Morgan, Citigroup, HSBC Holdings, Royal Bank of Scotland,
Deutsche Bank, and Bank of America. Lindsay Fortado et al., UBS Turning Whistleblower in
LIBOR Probe Pressures Rivals, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2012, 4:43 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2012-02-21/ubs-turning-whistleblower-in-libor-probe-pressures-rivals.html; Hugh Son,
BofA Says LIBOR Probe Draws U.S. Subpoenas on Submissions, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2012,
11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2012-08-02/bofa-says-libor-probe-draws-u-s-subpoe
nas-on-submissions.html.
49. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *3-11, *18-23; Final Notice to Barclays,
supra note 13, 11 8-14, 52-98; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 5-13, 15-22.
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on what benefitted their trading position.50 The external manipula-
tion would occur when such requests were made on behalf of traders
from another bank.5' These LIBOR manipulation requests were
made verbally and in writing, often by email, and appear to be quite
numerous. 52 The email communications reveal a global financial sys-
tem exploited by insiders for personal gain and devoid of free-market
fundamentals. For example, a trader from a LIBOR panel bank com-
plained to a trader from another LIBOR panel bank regarding a low
LIBOR submission: "duuuude. . . whats up with ur guys 34.5 3m fix
. . . tell him to get it up!!"5 3 To date, the evidence indicates that a
majority of the time the LIBOR data submitter complied with the
requests. 54
LIBOR manipulation to gain an unfair advantage in a trading posi-
tion was only one motive for participating banks. The second motive
for LIBOR manipulation was to avoid the public perception that the
participating banks were at risk of failing during the financial crisis.55
In this regard, LIBOR manipulation starting around September 2007
was geared toward making it appear that the participating banks were
stable by submitting artificially low rates.56 As with the manipulation
for profit on a trading position, investigations are ongoing, but there is
already a significant amount of evidence documenting the
manipulation.57
Because of the length of time involved-from 2005, if not earlier,
until at least 2009, if not later 58-and the magnitude of the assets in-
volved, around $560 trillion, the ill-gotten gains skimmed by the LI-
BOR manipulators are difficult to calculate at this time but estimates
50. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *3-11, *18-23; Final Notice to Barclays,
supra note 13, IT 8-14, 52-98; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 5-13, 15-22.
51. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *3-11, *18-23; Final Notice to Barclays,
supra note 13, IT 8-14, 52-98; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 5-13, 15-22.
52. Investigations are ongoing, but it appears that just one panel bank, Barclays, had at least
257 such manipulation requests from 2005 to 2009 for various LIBOR rates. Final Notice to
Barclays, supra note 13, 56.
53. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 91; see In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS
39, at *3-11, *18-23; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 5-13, 15-22.
54. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *25-28, *62; Final Notice to Barclays, supra
note 13, I1 63-80; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 5-13, 15-22.
55. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *44-64; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note
13, 1 102-45; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 15-22.
56. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *44-64; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note
13, IT 102-45; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 15-22.
57. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13; State-
ment of Facts, supra note 13.
58. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, I1 53-145; Timeline: Libor-Fixing Scandal, BBC,
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18671255 (last updated Feb. 6, 2013).
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have them in the multi-million to multi-billions of dollars.59 Given the
large volume, in terms of assets involved, it is helpful to have some
perspective: "A 1 basis point change on US$ 1 billion is equivalent to
US$100,000 per annum."60 A basis point is one one-hundredth of a
percent.61 We are dealing with about $560 trillion in assets or about
560,000 times the one billion/one basis point hypothetical, meaning,
hypothetically, about $56 billion per annum. Considering the amount
of damages potentially involved, it is not surprising that civil actions
alleging antitrust violations, among other things, have already been
filed.62
III. LIBOR MANIPULATION AND SECTION 1 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT
The civil LIBOR litigation commenced in the United States alleges,
among other things, a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.63
This is the anti-cartel provision of United States antitrust law, and
based upon the information provided to date in the Barclays Settle-
ment, it would appear to have a fair chance of success. That said, as a
practical matter antitrust litigation is quite expensive, thus increasing
the economic justification for an early settlement-most likely just af-
ter the case is at issue. Accordingly, it is unlikely we will see a pub-
lished opinion on the antitrust issue in these civil actions. Still, it is
useful to analyze the application of antitrust law here because even
with the settlement of these civil actions and the regulatory settle-
ments the disgorgement of illegal profits will create some disincentive
to continue such conduct. Section 1 states, in pertinent part, "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal." 64
This statutory language has been interpreted as a two-prong test for
a Section 1 violation: (1) every contract, combination or conspiracy
(the agreement prong) and (2) the unreasonable restraint-of-trade
59. Das, Part 2, supra note 18; Das, Part 1, supra note 18; Kraten & Kraten, supra note 18.
60. Das, Part 1, supra note 18.
61. Bradley Scott Ritter & William R. Dauber, The Present and Future Role of the Electronic
Trading Linkage in the Developing International Securities Markets, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
EcON. 639, 660 n.148 (1989).
62. Adams v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-07461 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2012); In re LIBOR-
Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2262(NRB), 2011 WL 5007957 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
63. See Adams, No. 12-cv-07461; In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 2011
WL 5007957.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
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prong.65 Additionally, as discussed below, the civil antitrust plaintiff
must sustain an antitrust injury and establish damages.
A. Agreement Prong
The extensive documentary evidence, particularly e-mails, provided
by the Barclays Settlement with the FSA, the CFTC and the DOJ
indicates four potential types of agreements:
1. Internal agreements between Barclays traders and the Barclays
submitters;66
2. Internal agreements between Barclays management and Bar-
clays submitters;67
3. External agreements between Barclays submitters and traders
from other banks; 68 and
4. External agreements between Barclays submitters and submit-
ters from other banks.69
Barclays PLC is a British public limited company formed and head-
quartered in the United Kingdom.70 Barclays Bank is also a British
public limited company and was the submitter bank during the time
period in question.7' Barclays Bank is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Barclays PLC.72 Barclays Capital, Inc. is also a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of Barclays PLC and a sister subsidiary of Barclays Bank.73 The
evidence to date indicates that the internal agreements between Bar-
clays traders and Barclays submitters relating to trading positions may
have occurred between Barclays Bank as submitter and Barclays
Bank traders and Barclays Bank as submitter and Barclays Capital
traders. 74 The second type of internal agreement appears to have
been between the management of Barclays Bank and its submitters
and possibly the management of Barclays PLC and Barclays Bank
submitters relating to manipulating LIBOR due to concern about
65. PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 113 (6th
ed. 2004).
66. In re Barclays PLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 32,234, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at
*18-23 (June 27, 2012); Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 91 53-80; Statement of Facts,
supra note 13, at 5-9.
67. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *44-64; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note
13, 11 112-24; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 15-22.
68. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *22-28; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note
13, H 81-87; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 10-15.
69. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *22-28; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note
13, 91 81-87; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 10-15.
70. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *11.
71. Id. at *12-15,
72. Id. at *11.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *19-28; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 9 8-11, 53-80; Statement of Facts,
supra note 13, at 5-10.
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public perception during the financial crisis.75 The third type of agree-
ment is external between Barclays Bank submitters and traders from
other banks regarding LIBOR manipulation for trading position pur-
poses. 7 6 The final type of agreement is also external involving Bar-
clays Bank submitters and submitters from other banks relating to
manipulating LIBOR due to concern about public perception during
the financial crisis.77 The nature of each agreement (internal/external)
is important for antitrust purposes as current antitrust law holds that
agreements between a parent corporation and its wholly owned sub-
sidiary and agreements between sister subsidiaries do not usually con-
stitute two economic actors necessary for an agreement under Section
1.
1. Agreement in General
Usually, there is no direct evidence of an agreement to unreasona-
bly restrain trade, such as a written agreement, documentation or tes-
timony.78 However, such explicit agreements are not necessary to
maintain an action under Section 1.79 Inferences drawn from con-
duct8 0 and surrounding circumstances8' may be relied upon to estab-
lish the agreement. For example, verbal or written indirect
communications to a competitor through a press release or trade jour-
nal as well as more direct communications in a meeting may evidence
an agreement.82 Additionally, inferential evidence may include the
nature of proposals made,83 the manner in which proposals are
made,84 substantial unanimity of action,85 actions taken in concert,86
and familiarity with the purpose and scope of an arrangement.87 Ac-
cordingly, no formal agreement is necessary for the agreement prong
of Section 1.
75. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *44-64; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note
13, IT 12-14, 102-45; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 15-22.
76. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *22-28; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note
13, 11 8-11, 88-93; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 10-12.
77. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *44-64; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note
13, I 12-14, 102-45; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 15-22.
78. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939).
79. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 144 (1966); United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948).
80. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 221.
81. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274-76 (1942).
82. E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914).
83. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 221.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946).
87. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274-76 (1942).
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That said, there is a critical distinction between circumstantial evi-
dence of an improper interdependent agreement which violates Sec-
tion 1 and circumstantial evidence which merely establishes
independent action. Unfortunately, the circumstantial evidence does
not always provide a clear guide for this distinction.88 Accordingly,
evidence to establish the inference of an illegal agreement must also
exclude the possibility of independent action based upon legitimate
business judgment.89 Parallel conduct even to the point of substantial
unanimity of action, without more, will be insufficient to establish an
inferential, interdependent agreement as business strategy, and shared
market perceptions may also explain such conduct.90 What must be
established is parallel conduct and "plus factors," which tend to ex-
clude the possibility of independent business judgment while tending
to increase the likelihood of interdependent behavior. Plus factors
may include evidence of an improbable coincidence such as "(1) evi-
dence of conduct that is contrary to the defendants' independent self-
interest; (2) the presence or absence of a strong motive to enter into
the alleged conspiracy; (3) the artificial standardization of products;
and (4) a high level of inter[-]firm communications." 91
Facilitating practices, or actions that may have the effect of facilitat-
ing oligopolistic collaboration, may evidence the plus factors neces-
sary to establish the inference of an agreement. For example, plans to
provide pricing and practices information to achieve stability and uni-
formity, especially when natural competitors do not behave in such a
fashion, may evidence an interdependent agreement under Section
1.92 Thus, parallel pricing together with facilitating practices, such as
information exchanges between competitors, may be sufficient to es-
tablish the inference of an interdependent agreement for purposes of
Section 1.
Conversely, divergent interests may indicate a lack of an agreement.
For example, a firm with high costs may have to keep prices higher
than a firm with low costs in order to obtain the same profit levels or
reflect other economic realities. 93 Thus, conduct which may equally
88. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).
89. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986); Monsanto,
465 U.S. at 763-64.
90. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-54 (2007).
91. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 773 F. Supp. 2d 351, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); see also In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 894 F. Supp. 703, 713 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
92. Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
93. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 38219, 1974 WL 926 (E.D. Mich. 1974); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE
187-89 (4th ed. 2011).
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be explained as independent business judgment will not establish an
agreement under Section 1, but conduct which makes no economic
sense other than anticompetitive purposes is what is required. 9 4 In the
financial services sector, evidence based on statistical analysis to es-
tablish an anomaly may be sufficient when augmented with evidence
from a governmental investigation.9 5
2. Analysis of an Agreement as Applied in the
Barclays Settlement
The Barclays Settlement indicates that this is one of those rare occa-
sions where there is direct evidence of an external agreement, such as
emails, between Barclays Bank submitters and traders from other
banks. For example:
[O]n 26 October 2006, an external trader made a request for a lower
three month US dollar LIBOR submission. The external trader
stated in an email to Trader G at Barclays "If it comes in unchanged
I'm a dead man". Trader G responded that he would "have a chat".
Barclays' submission on that day for three month US dollar LIBOR
was half a basis point lower than the day before, rather than being
unchanged. The external trader thanked Trader G for Barclays' LI-
BOR submission later that day: "Dude. I owe you big time! Come
over one day after work and I'm opening a bottle of Bollinger." 96
There is also such evidence relating to internal agreements between
Barclays Bank submitters and Barclays Bank traders; Barclays Bank
submitters and Barclays Capital traders; Barclays Bank submitters
and Barclays Bank managers and possibly management from Barclays
PLC.9 7 However, as discussed in more detail below, the internal
agreements may not meet the more than one economic actor require-
ment for Section 1 agreement.
Even if direct evidence were missing, the circumstantial evidence
indicated by the statistical analysis of the LIBOR rate during the time
94. Hinds Cnty. v. Wachovia Bank N.A. (Hinds Cnty. II), 708 F. Supp. 2d 348, 358-63
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); see E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
136 (1961).
95. Hinds Cnty. v. Wachovia Bank N.A. (Hinds Cnty. 1), 700 F. Supp. 2d 378. 394-95
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that municipal derivatives transactions, where the bidding spread was
more than 100 basis points, were a sufficient anomaly to plausibly infer an agreement of bid
rigging in violation of Section 1, which was augmented with evidence derived from a government
investigation of the bid-rigging conduct).
96. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 1 83; see In re Barclays PLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 32,234, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *23-26 (June 27, 2012); Statement of Facts, supra
note 13. at 11.
97. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *19-28; Final Notice to Barclays, supra note
13, 53-80; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 11-22.
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in question, governmental investigations,98 parallel conduct together
with a uniformity of products, motive, inter-firm communications, and
the fact that such rate manipulation would make little economic sense
unless this was coordinated would indicate an interdependent agree-
ment in violation of Section 1.99
3. Intra-Enterprise Agreements
Because Section 1 requires an agreement, unilateral conduct is ex-
cluded.1oo But this seemingly simple point belies more complex situa-
tions. For example, What if two persons within one corporation form
an agreement to unreasonably restrain trade? A literal interpretation
of Section 1 would lead to the conclusion that in such a case, say an
agreement between officers of one corporation, Section 1 would be
applicable as we literally have "two persons." However, the courts
have ruled out such possibilities by interpreting the agreement prong
to require two separate economic actors using a functional analysis
that takes into consideration a "complete unity of interest," as evi-
denced by common objectives: a single "corporate consciousnesses"
and no "sudden joining of economic resources that had previously
served different interests."10 This is important in the LIBOR case
because, as the Barclays example shows, we may have communica-
tions between a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary as
well as between sister subsidiaries. If these various Barclays entities
are considered one economic actor, then the communications between
these entities would not establish two or more economic actors neces-
sary for an agreement under Section 1. But if we have, as an eco-
nomic reality, two economic actors, these communications may indeed
be evidence of an agreement.
a. A History of the Intra-Enterprise Problem
The language of Section 1 is broad and general, in part, to address
"the many new forms of contracts and combinations, ... which were
98. Hinds Cnty. II, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 358-63; Hinds Cnty. I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 394-95.
99. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 773 F. Supp. 2d 351, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); see also In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 894 F. Supp. 703, 713 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
100. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-72 (1984) (stating that
"Section 1 of the Sherman Act ... reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effected by a con-
tract, combination . . . or conspiracy between separate entities. It does not reach conduct that is
'wholly unilateral'. . . . In any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own
interests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only reduces
the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the economic
power moving in one particular direction").
101. Id.
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being evolved from existing economic conditions." 1 0 2 During the
early days of the Sherman Act, the law against cartels was thought to
still allow combinations through mergers and the formation of holding
companies. 103 Merger issues were addressed through the implementa-
tion of new laws in the Clayton Act'4 but holding companies went
through an evolutionary process through the Sherman Act. At first,
under the intra-enterprise doctrine, the United States Supreme Court
held that two legally separate but related corporations would count as
the "two persons" required to form an agreement under Section 1.105
However, with the passage of time and lapses in memories of the past,
this intra-enterprise doctrine began to erode and was replaced with
the two "economic actors" and functionality test. The current law on
this issue has, at times, been misunderstood as a complete ban on the
possibility that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary could consti-
tute two economic actors for purposes of Section 1.106 This is an inac-
curate statement of the law. The Barclays Settlement, indeed,
presents an interesting opportunity to apply the separate economic
actors test in a parent/wholly owned subsidiary situation as the settle-
ment documents do evidence divergent economic interests and func-
tionally separate actors.
Northern Securities is the first case to address the intra-enterprise
doctrine. There, the circuit court's decision, affirmed by the United
States Supreme Court by a narrow 5-4 decision, found two persons
for purposes of Section 1 when two competing railroad companies:
Great Northern Railway Company, and . . . Northern Pacific Rail-
way Company, entered into a combination to form . . . a holding
corporation, to be called the Northern Securities Company .. . and
to which company ... was to be turned over the capital stock, or a
controlling interest in the capital stock, of each of the constituent
railway companies, with power in the holding corporation to vote
such stock and in all respects to act as the owner thereof .... 107
At the time of the circuit court's opinion, C. C. Langdell of Harvard
Law School criticized the decision in part because, "[i]n the Northern
Securities Case . .. there is only one person concerned, namely, the
102. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 85-86 (1912).
103. See Union Pac., 226 U.S. 61; N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); C. C.
Langdell, The Northern Securities Case and the Sherman Anti- Trust Act, 16 HARV. L. REV. 539
(1903).
104. 12 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
105. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. 197.
106. Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Wilmington, 633 F. Supp. 386, 395 (D.
Del. 1986).
107. N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 320-22.
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Northern Securities Company." 08 In essence, Langdell and other
critics of Northern Securities were holding to a formalistic legal fiction,
form over substance, that ignored economic reality, namely an at-
tempt to end-run the Sherman Act.
The approach of substance over form articulated in Northern Secur-
ities continued in Union Pacific Railroad Co. where Union Pacific pur-
chased up to forty-six per cent of the outstanding stock of its
competitor, Southern Pacific Company. The stock was held for Union
Pacific by one of its proprietary companies, the Oregon Short Line
Railroad Company. The government claimed that this "domination
over and control of the Southern Pacific Company" was a violation of
antitrust laws.109 The Supreme Court agreed and held:
Nor do we think it can make any difference that instead of resort-
ing to a holding company, as was done in the Northern Securities
Case, the controlling interest in the stock of one corporation is
transferred to the other. The domination and control, and the
power to suppress competition, are acquired in the one case no less
than in the other, and the resulting mischief, at which the statute
was aimed, is equally effective whichever form is adopted. The stat-
ute in its terms embraces every contract or combination, in form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce.110
A similar approach was applied in a vertically integrated enterprise
in Yellow Cab where there was common ownership between a manu-
facturer of taxicabs, the sellers of the taxicabs, and the taxicab service
providers. Acknowledging the creativity of the human mind when it
comes to subverting the law for profit, the Court held:
The fact that these restraints occur in a setting described by the
appellees as a vertically integrated enterprise does not necessarily
remove the ban of the Sherman Act. The test of illegality under the
Act is the presence or absence of an unreasonable restraint on inter-
state commerce. Such a restraint may result as readily from a con-
spiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common
ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise in-
dependent. Similarly, any affiliation or integration flowing from an
illegal conspiracy cannot insulate the conspirators from the sanc-
tions which Congress has imposed. The corporate interrelationships
of the conspirators, in other words, are not determinative of the ap-
108. Langdell, supra note 103, at 546.
109. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61, 79 (1912).
110. Id. at 85-86.
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plicability of the Sherman Act. That statute is aimed at substance
rather than form. 1I
However, in Copperweld, the Supreme Court reversed, in part, and
distinguished the holding of Yellow Cab:
It has long been clear that a pattern of acquisitions may itself create
a combination illegal under § 1, especially when an original anti-
competitive purpose is evident from the affiliated corporations' sub-
sequent conduct.4 The Yellow Cab passage is most fairly read in
light of this settled rule. In Yellow Cab, the affiliation of the de-
fendants was irrelevant because the original acquisitions were them-
selves illegal. An affiliation "flowing from an illegal conspiracy"
would not avert sanctions. Common ownership and control were
irrelevant because restraint of trade was "the primary object of the
combination," which was created in a "'deliberate, calculated"'
manner.
4 Under the arrangements condemned in Northern Securities Co.
v. United States, "all the stock [a railroad holding company]
held or acquired in the constituent companies was acquired and
held to be used in suppressing competition between those com-
panies. It came into existence only for that purpose." In Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States and United States v. American
Tobacco Co., the trust or holding company device brought to-
gether previously independent firms to lessen competition and
achieve monopoly power.112
Thus, the Court is distinguishing the intra-enterprise cases on the
grounds that the combinations at issue in those cases, by trusts or
holding companies, were created by the joining of former competitors
into a new corporate organization for the express purpose of sup-
pressing competition.
The Court in Copperweld further articulated a substance over form
rule in terms of two separate economic actors:
The distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct is nec-
essary for a proper understanding of the terms "contract, combina-
tion . . . or conspiracy" in § 1. Nothing in the literal meaning of
those terms excludes coordinated conduct among officers or em-
ployees of the same company. But it is perfectly plain that an inter-
nal "agreement" to implement a single, unitary firm's policies does
not raise the antitrust dangers that § 1 was designed to police. The
officers of a single firm are not separate economic actors pursuing
separate economic interests, so agreements among them do not sud-
denly bring together economic power that was previously pursuing
111. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1947); see also Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951) (holding that common ownership and
control does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws).
112. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 760-62 & n.4 (1984) (foot-
note omitted) (citations omitted).
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divergent goals. Coordination within a firm is as likely to result
from an effort to compete as from an effort to stifle competition. In
the marketplace, such coordination may be necessary if a business
enterprise is to compete effectively. For these reasons, officers or
employees of the same firm do not provide the plurality of actors
imperative for a § 1 conspiracy.
There is also general agreement that § 1 is not violated by the
internally coordinated conduct of a corporation and one of its unin-
corporated divisions.... A division within a corporate structure pur-
sues the common interests of the whole rather than interests separate
from those of the corporation itself; a business enterprise establishes
divisions to further its own interests in the most efficient manner.
Because coordination between a corporation and its division does
not represent a sudden joining of two independent sources of eco-
nomic power previously pursuing separate interests, it is not an ac-
tivity that warrants § 1 scrutiny. t 3
The major, though unsubstantiated, assumption in the above reason-
ing of the Court is that the officers and directors of one corporation
and unincorporated divisions of a corporation are all simply pursuing
the common interests of the corporation, not their own personal eco-
nomic interests to the detriment of the corporation.
The Supreme Court in Copperweld then went on to hold:
For similar reasons, the coordinated activity of a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enter-
prise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. A parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their
objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate ac-
tions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate con-
sciousnesses, but one.. . . With or without a formal "agreement,"
the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder.
If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do "agree" to a course of
action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had
previously served different interests, and there is no justification
for § 1 scrutiny.
Indeed, the very notion of an "agreement" in Sherman Act terms
between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary lacks meaning.
A § 1 agreement may be found when "the conspirators had a unity
of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of
minds in an unlawful arrangement." American Tobacco Co. v.
United States. But in reality a parent and a wholly owned subsidi-
ary always have a "unity of purpose or a common design." They
share a common purpose whether or not the parent keeps a tight
rein over the subsidiary; the parent may assert full control at any
moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the parent's best interests.1 14
113. Id. at 768-72 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
114. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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By synthesizing Copperweld, what we are allegedly looking at with the
parent/wholly owned subsidiary situation is one entity because, while
legally two (for purposes of liability and perhaps tax reasons), they are
economically one. This is so due to the "complete unity of inter-
est,"115 as evidenced by common objectives, single "corporate con-
sciousnesses,"1 6 the subsidiary always acting for the benefit of the
parent, and "no sudden joining of economic resources that had previ-
ously served different interests."117 They are but one because the
"parent may assert full control at any moment"' 18-theoretically. Of
course, if there are separate profit-making interests and the parent has
little control over the subsidiary, then it makes no sense to treat the
parent and subsidiary as one for antitrust purposes.119 Thus, Cop-
perweld does not exclude the possibility that a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary may be two independent economic actors for pur-
poses of Section 1; it merely eliminates the presumption that two le-
gally separate entities can form an agreement under Section 1 in the
parent/wholly owned subsidiary context.120 A similar analysis has
been applied in the situation of sister subsidiaries.121
The Court's holding in the Copperweld case was subsequently inter-
preted by some courts to mean that "[a] parent corporation and its
wholly owned subsidiaries share a common purpose and cannot, as a
matter of law, conspire with each other in violation of Section 1."122
However, such an approach is too formalistic and does not take into
account the functional considerations required by Copperweld. This
was clarified by the Supreme Court in American Needle where the
Court indicates a more flexible rule regarding intra-enterprises. In ad-
dressing whether the NFL, a single entity comprised of thirty-two sep-
arate entities, must be considered a single entity under the
Copperweld analysis, the Court held:
We have long held that concerted action under § 1 does not turn
simply on whether the parties involved are legally distinct entities.
Instead, we have eschewed such formalistic distinctions in favor of a
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768-72.
118. Id.
119. HOVENKAMP, supra note 93, at 203-04.
120. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2210 (2010).
121. Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that
sister corporations and parent count as one economic actor); Hood v. Tenneco Tex. Life Ins. Co.,
739 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Copperweld to sister subsidiaries of the same parent).
122. Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Wilmington, 633 F. Supp. 386, 395 (D.
Del. 1986).
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functional consideration of how the parties involved in the alleged
anticompetitive conduct actually operate. 123
Although, under a now-defunct doctrine known as the "in-
traenterprise conspiracy doctrine," we once treated cooperation be-
tween legally separate entities as necessarily covered by § 1, we now
embark on a more functional analysis. 124
We generally treat agreements within a single firm as indepen-
dent action on the presumption that the components of the firm will
act to maximize the firm's profits. But in rare cases, that presump-
tion does not hold. Agreements made within a firm can constitute
concerted action covered by § I when the parties to the agreement act
on interests separate from those of the firm itself and the intrafirm
agreements may simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing concerted
action. 125
Accordingly, when parties to the agreement are acting on interests
separate from the firm's, we have two economic actors for purposes of
a Section 1 agreement. Continuing with that logic, if a wholly owned
subsidiary is acting on interests separate from the parent's, we have
two economic actors. While theoretically a parent can always fully
assert control over its wholly owned subsidiary, the reality of the situ-
ation may establish that corporations, which are too big to manage,
negate the parent's ability to control the subsidiary.
b. As Applied in the Barclays Settlement
In his testimony before the Treasury Committee for the United
Kingdom regarding the LIBOR manipulation, the CEO of Barclays
PLC, Bob Diamond, stated:
When I knew of [LIBOR manipulation] was during the investiga-
tion, if that was your question. But I want to correct one thing you
said, George. You said that the traders were acting on behalf of
Barclays. They were acting on behalf of themselves. It is unclear
whether it benefited Barclays but I don't think they had any interest
in benefiting Barclays, they were benefiting themselves.1 26
This statement indicates a lack of unity of economic interests between
Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank, Barclays Capital, and the functional
equivalent of separate economic actors pursuing their own interests.
Further, it also evidences a formalistic shell for ongoing concerted ac-
123. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2209.
124. Id. at 2210.
125. Id. at 2215 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
126. HC 481-i, supra note 9, at 21.
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tion,127 which would support a finding of two economic actors for the
agreement prong under Section 1. However, it appears that Mr. Dia-
mond was referring to the pre-crisis period when LIBOR was manipu-
lated to benefit individual traders. What about the post-2008 period
when LIBOR was manipulated to avoid the public perception that the
participating banks were at risk of failing during the financial crisis?
A more difficult matter to prove, but should it ever be in the eco-
nomic interest of a corporation to break the law? Certainly, the an-
swer would be yes in a country not governed by the rule of law as the
economic reality would indicate, at least in the short term, that crime
does pay.
As for the parental control requirement articulated by the Court in
Copperweld, as a functional matter, it is rather difficult for a parent to
"assert full control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the
parent's best interests" 128 when the parent has no idea what the sub-
sidiary is doing. For example, Mr. Diamond, the CEO of Barclays as
of 2010 prior to which he was the CEO of Barclays Capital, did not
learn about the manipulation of LIBOR rates until July 2012.129 Fur-
ther, Barclays has been fined by regulatory authorities over the past
few years for things such as violating international sanctions against
Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Burma, client money breaches, and
selling risky investment products to older people. In response to these
facts, Mr. Diamond stated that, while this was no excuse, Barclays is a
large organization.13o Additionally, the investigation of Barclays relat-
ing to the LIBOR manipulation has found that Barclays failed to have
adequate control systems in place to ensure such conduct could not
happen. 131 Finally, the financial crisis in general has led many experts
to the conclusion that systemic banks are too big to manage.132 Ac-
127. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2208-17.
128. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-72 (1984).
129. HC 481-i, supra note 9, at 19.
130. Id. at 42.
131. Press Release, Fin. Servs. Auth., Barclays Fined £59.5 Million for Significant Failings in
Relation to LIBOR and EURIBOR (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/
communication/pr/2012/070.shtml.
132. Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save?: Examining the Systemic Threats of Large Financial
Institutions, 111th Cong. 25-26 (2009) (statement of Dr. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia
University); Brooksley Born, Financial Reform and the Causes of the Financial Crisis, 1 AM. U.
Bus. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011); Andrea M. Corcoran, Globalization Report Cards for Securities Regula-
tors: National Enforcement of International Capital Market Standards for Information Sharing
and Cooperation and the Prevention of Financial Crises, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 675 (2010);
Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services Industry Puts Together Let No Person Put Asun-
der: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the 2008-2009 American Capital Markets
Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 371, 400, 405-10 (2010); Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding
Company Act a Model for Breaking Up the Banks that Are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
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cordingly, the notion of parental control in the corporate setting
seems to suffer the same attenuated connection to reality as it does in
the human setting.
B. Unreasonable Restraint-of- Trade Prong
The second prong of a Section 1 violation is the unreasonable re-
straint-of-trade prong. Although the statute forbids agreements "in
restraint-of-trade or commerce," that statutory language has been in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court to prohibit unreasonable restraints of
trade or commerce as the statutory language, taken quite literally,
could forbid every kind of contract because every contract does, to
some extent, restrain trade. 33 Here, the courts will examine the na-
ture of the agreement or alleged unreasonable conduct. Certain
agreements, such as horizontal price fixing, are deemed illegal per se
as they lack any redeeming competitive virtue.134 Other agreements,
even vertical price-fixing agreements, may have certain competitive
virtues. Accordingly, such agreements are tested under the rule of
reason where evidence can be presented to establish the market ef-
fects and competitive reasonableness of the conduct.'35
1. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade in General
In determining the extent of evidence regarding market effects nec-
essary to determine if the restraint is indeed unreasonable, the nature
of the conduct 36 together with whether the agreement was horizontal
or vertical137 will be determinative. For example, a horizontal price-
821, 842 (2011); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES passim (2011); Simon Johnson, JP Morgan Debacle Reveals Fatal
Flaw in Federal Reserve Thinking, THE BASELINE SCENARIO (May 11, 2012), http:/Ibaselinescena
rio.com/2012/05/11/jp-morgan-debacle-reveals-fatal-flaw-in-federal-reserve-thinking/ ("The les-
sons from JP Morgan's losses are simple. Such banks have become too large and complex for
management to control what is going on.. . . And the regulators also have no idea about what is
going on. Attempts to oversee these banks in a sophisticated and nuanced way are not
working.").
133. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342 n.12 (1982); see also Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 n.9 (1978); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d
Cir. 2003).
134. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979); Leegin, 551 U.S.
at 886-87.
135. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885-86.
136. For example, price fixing or market allocation. Id. at 886 (involving horizontal agree-
ments among competitors to fix price or allocate markets).
137. DeLong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d 1499 (1989) ("Restraints on
competition . . . fall into two broad categories, horizontal and vertical. Vertical restraints occur
between entities at different levels of distribution in order to control the price or path of a
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fixing agreement, as appears to be the case with LIBOR manipula-
tion, is still thought to be the type of conduct that is per se an antitrust
violation. What this means as a practical matter is that the amount of
evidence necessary to succeed in establishing the unreasonable re-
straint-of-trade prong is minimal. Prove that the conduct occurred,
and it will be presumed that there was an unreasonable restraint.138
However, most conduct is reviewed under the rule of reason analysis,
which requires more information (evidence) in order to determine if
the conduct unreasonably restrains trade or commerce. 139 As the LI-
BOR manipulation appears, at present, to be limited to horizontal
price-fixing agreements, the analysis in this Article is limited to such
conduct which is, at least as of the date of this Article, still a per se
analysis.
2. Price Fixing
From early on, the Court has been concerned about an overzealous
application of antitrust laws resulting in too many "false positives"
with an effect of harming commerce and undermining the free mar-
ket. 140 That said, the horizontal price-fixing agreement has a particu-
larly special place in American antitrust history stemming from the
Robber Baron period when the Sherman Act was first passed. It was
the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the fewl41 by horizontal
agreements, perceived to have been accomplished by dint of bribery
and corruption rather than the sweat of the brow, that was the focus
of the Sherman Act.142 Due to this historical perspective, together
with conduct deemed anticompetitive and exclusionary, horizontal
price fixing is still considered to lack any redeeming economic virtue
and a per se violation.143 Additionally, horizontal price fixing has
product after the product leaves the manufacturer, while restraints between competitors at the
same level of distribution are characterized as horizontal.").
138. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343-44.
139. Id. at 343.
140. United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 369 (1912) ("[T]he words 'restraint of trade'
should be given a meaning which would not destroy the individual right of contract, and render
difficult, if not impossible, any movement of trade in the character of interstate commerce, the
free movement of which it was the purpose of the statute to protect."); see also United States v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
141. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 430 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911); McGahee v. N. Propane
Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1497 n.27 (11th Cir. 1988).
142. 21 CONG. REc. 4102-03 (1890).
143. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493
U.S. 411 (1990); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Catalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980); Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969);
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342
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been deemed to interfere "with the setting of price by free market
forces" further justifying a per se rule.144
Basically, price fixing does not mean inflexible or uniform pricel 45
just agreed upon within a range.146 The effect of the price-fixing
agreement needs to only curtail competition, and evidence that a "rea-
sonable price" was charged is irrelevant.147 So, in addition to an
agreement, a Section 1 claim for horizontal price fixing must show
that the agreement is among competitors on the same plane of distri-
bution (thus horizontal) "with the purpose or effect of raising, de-
pressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing price of a commodity . . . in
interstate or foreign commerce."148 The DOJ has defined price fixing
as follows:
Price fixing is an agreement among competitors to raise, fix, or
otherwise maintain the price at which their goods or services are
sold. It is not necessary that the competitors agree to charge exactly
the same price, or that every competitor in a given industry join the
conspiracy. Price fixing can take many forms, and any agreement
that restricts price competition violates the law. Other examples of
price-fixing agreements include those to:
* Hold prices firm.
* Adopt a standard formula for computing prices.
U.S. 371 (1952); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); United States v. Frankfort Distil-
leries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707
(1944); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 274 (1942); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). As applied in financial services cases, see Hinds Cnty.
v. Wachovia Bank N.A. (Hinds Cnty. II), 708 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Brennan v. Con-
cord EFS, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers &
Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit
Co., 358 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
144. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (emphasis added).
Vertical price fixing is not per se illegal. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
485 U.S. 717 (1988).
145. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 222-23; see also United States v. N. Sec. Co., 120 F. 721 (D.
Minn. 1903), aff'd, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
146. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. at 276; Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir.
1944), affd, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); see also United States v. Food & Grocery Bureau of S. Cal., 43
F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Cal. 1942), affd, 139 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1943).
147. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 220-21.
148. Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir.
1989).
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* Fix credit terms.149
3. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade as Applied in the
Barclays Settlement
While the Barclays Settlement strongly indicates a horizontal price-
fixing agreement, I suppose one could look at the Barclays submitters
as the "manufacturers" of the LIBOR rates, which would certainly be
correct in a rather ironic sense, and the traders at Barclays Capital as
the "wholesalers" of such rates, thus giving us a vertical relationship
and no per se rule at least regarding the intra-firm agreements. The
inter-firm agreements with other banks could still be horizontal as
there appears to be agreements on the same level of distribution, i.e.
between submitters and between traders.150 But it appears from the
Barclays Settlements that everyone and his brother at Barclays were
involved in the "manufacturing" of the interest rate which would put
them all at the same level of distribution.15' Further, Barclays PLC,
Barclays Bank, and Barclays Capital were all "wholesalers" of the LI-
BOR interest rates in that each would use the rates for pricing of in-
terest sensitive financial productsl 52 as well as for submission to
regulators for purposes of establishing financial stability.153
As to the price fixing aspects, the emails referenced above indicate
agreements between traders, submitters, and management to raise or
depress1 54 the various LIBOR rates. For example:
[Price Raised]
On 6 August 2007, a Submitter even offered to submit a US dollar
rate higher than that requested:
Trader F: "Pls set 3m libor as high as possible today"
Submitter: "Sure 5.37 okay?"
Trader F: "5.36 is fine" 55
149. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET ALLOCATION
SCHEMES: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT TO LOOK FOR (2001).
150. In re Barclays PLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 32,234, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at
*22-28 (June 27, 2012); Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 91 81-87; Statement of Facts,
supra note 13, at 10-15.
151. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *5-10, *18-28; Final Notice to Barclays,
supra note 13, 1 53-87; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 5-15.
152. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *5-10, *18-28; Final Notice to Barclays,
supra note 13, 1 8-11, 52-101; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 5-15.
153. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *8-10, *44-64; Final Notice to Barclays,
supra note 13, 11 12-14, 102-45; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 15-22.
154. Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1361 (10th Cir.
1989).
155. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 1 67.
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[Price Depressed]
Trader C requested low one month and three month US dollar LI-
BOR submissions at 10:52 am on 7 April 2006 (shortly before the
submissions were due to be made); "If it's not too late low Im and
3m would be nice, but please feel free to say "no". . . Coffees will be
coming your way either way, just to say thank you for your help in
the past few weeks". A Submitter responded "Done . .. for you big
boy".156
Accordingly, while there may be some issues regarding the horizontal
or vertical nature of the agreements, the conduct involved fits the def-
inition of price fixing.
IV. No ONE WAS DAMAGED
It has been suggested that establishing damages, if any, resulting
from LIBOR manipulation will be difficult if not impossible.157 That
said, establishing damages is only relevant relating to civil antitrust
actions not criminal. 58 For criminal antitrust violations, an intent ele-
ment must be proved. 159 With regard to the civil antitrust damages,
we already have several class actions pending and alleging that the
LIBOR manipulation violates Section 1 and that plaintiffs have been
damaged as a result.160 In at least one case, the trial court has held
that no damage resulting from antitrust violations (antitrust injury)
has been alleged.161
The argument that no one was damaged seems to be premised on
the assumption that all LIBOR manipulation victims were mortgagors
or other debtors with debt instruments that were adjustable based
upon a LIBOR rate. If LIBOR has been manipulated down, at least
since 2008, the theory goes that these debtors would benefit by the
lower interest rates. Such a premise is off the mark for at least two
reasons. First, it ignores the victims of interest rate swaps who are
harmed by a reduced interest rate, and second, it has been alleged that
156. Id. $ 65.
157. Das, Part 2, supra note 18; Kraten & Kraten, supra note 18.
158. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990); HOVENKAMP, supra note
93, at 659.
159. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 388 (1991); United States
v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); ALBERT H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHER-
MAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (1910).
160. In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2262(NRB), 2011 WL
5007957 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011); Adams v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-07461 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
4, 2012).
161. In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2262(NRB), 2013 WL
1285338, at *15-24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013).
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the LIBOR rates relevant to mortgages were adjusted up during this
period on the readjustment date and back down again the next day.16 2
If these allegations are established, then the assumption that holders
of mortgages with variable interest rates always benefitted from LI-
BOR manipulation down would be incorrect.
Further, although LIBOR manipulation down may theoretically
benefit some people, it harms those investors who benefit from in-
creases in interest rates by virtue of investments in interest rate swaps.
Some of these interest rate swap investors included state and local
governments where the ultimate harm would be to the taxpayers.163
Basically, local governments used to issue fixed rate bonds in order to
have certainty regarding payment costs. Variable rate bonds typically
carried a lower interest rate, but there was the risk of an interest rate
increase which could result in a surprise increase in taxes for taxpay-
ers. Bankers advised local governments that they could get the lower
variable rate at, in essence, a fixed rate if they would enter into an
interest rate swap. If the interest rates went up, they were protected.
The catch-the local governments had to agree to waive their call op-
tions, i.e. the rights to redeem their bonds before maturity and issue
new ones at the lower rate if interest rates went down. When interest
rates did go down, in part by LIBOR manipulation, local governments
lost billions of taxpayer dollars due to these interest rate swaps and
the banks involved gained billions of taxpayer dollars.164
As for mortgages, a recent class action complaint filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleges
that the variable interest rates on mortgages tied to LIBOR rates were
manipulated to the harm of the mortgagors. In this case, it is alleged
that the banks manipulated the LIBOR rates up on the first of each
month when the mortgage rates readjusted, then manipulated them
back down the next day so the banks would still look financially sta-
ble.165 Provided that the plaintiffs can establish that they suffered
these damages due to the LIBOR manipulation and that these dam-
ages are an "antitrust injury," damages should be recoverable. In this
regard, the plaintiffs must be direct, not indirect, victims of defendants
LIBOR manipulation, meaning that they may have to prove that they
purchased their financial products from a LIBOR panel bank.166
162. Adams, No. 12-cv-07461.
163. Randall Dodd, Municipal Bombs, 47 Fn;. & DEv. 33 (2010).
164. William J. Quirk, Too Big to Fail and Too Risky to Exist, THE Am. SCHOLAR, Autumn
2012, at 5.
165. Adams, No. 12-cv-07461.
166. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730-31 (1977).
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A. Damages in Private Civil Actions
In a civil antitrust action, including Section 1 actions, a plaintiff
must establish (1) that it suffered an injury, (2) that the injury was
caused by the antitrust violation, and (3) that the injury is an "anti-
trust injury"-an injury of the type that antitrust laws were intended
to prevent.167 An antitrust injury must be attributable to the anticom-
petitive conduct.168 Even in a per se case, a private antitrust plaintiff
will be required to establish an antitrust injury.169 For example, if
plaintiff is a competitor of defendant and its alleged losses are due to
increased competition this would not be an antitrust injury as the al-
leged injury of increased competition for plaintiff/competitor is not
the type of injury antitrust laws are intended to prevent.170 In a hori-
zontal price-fixing case, antitrust injuries include lost profits due to the
improper price fixing and lost opportunity to compete.171
B. Damage Analysis as Applied in the Barclays Settlement
First, the plaintiff must establish that it suffered an injury. We are
dealing here with two distinct periods of conduct: the first period from
about 2005 to 2008 where the manipulation of LIBOR appeared to be
primarily to benefit a trader's position. While LIBOR is based upon
estimates, these estimates are supposed to be based on interbank bor-
rowing, not trading positions.172 The Barclays Settlement provides ev-
idence and data to calculate manipulation based upon trading
positions. For example:
Trader C: "The big day [has] arrived. . . My NYK are screaming
at me about an unchanged 3m libor. As always, any
help wd be greatly appreciated. What do you think
you'll go for 3m?"
Submitter: "I am going 90 altho 91 is what I should be posting." 7 3
During this period the LIBOR rates went up at times and they went
down at times as traders could also profit in a reduced LIBOR rate
167. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990); HOVENKAMP, supra note
93, at 659.
168. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
169. At. Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 339-40; DeLong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Electro Miner-
als Corp., 990 F.2d 1186, 1198 (11th Cir. 1993).
170. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1977).
171. DeLong Equip. Co., 990 F.2d at 1198-99.
172. The Basics, supra note 20.
173. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, IT 11-13.
2013] LIBOR MANIPULATION AND ANTITRUST ALLEGATIONS
similar to going short in the market.174 To the extent a trader and his
client benefitted, some counterparty lost. This is not a win-win sport.
The counterparty should be able to claim an injury due to the lost
profits.175
However, the counterparty would have to establish the causal con-
nection between the injury (lost profits) and the antitrust conduct (LI-
BOR manipulation or price fixing). While the Supreme Court has
held that it is enough to show that the antitrust conduct was a "mate-
rial cause" of the injury,176 some subsequent decisions have applied a
"substantial factor" test.'77 As a practical matter, this may be a dis-
tinction without a difference.178 In any event, the civil counterparty
plaintiff will have to separate the damages caused by the antitrust con-
duct from damages caused by other factors.179 Given that these dam-
ages arise from interest rate sensitive financial products and that the
damages are directly related to the manipulation of interest rates, cau-
sation should not be a problem although the amount at issue may be
in dispute. Here the Barclays Settlement documents provide some ev-
idence as to the amount due to the LIBOR manipulation. Use the
same quotation above from the Barclays Settlement as our example:
Trader C: "The big day [has] arrived. . My NYK are screaming
at me about an unchanged 3m libor. As always, any
help wd be greatly appreciated. What do you think
you'll go for 3m?"
Submitter: "I am going 90 altho 91 is what I should be posting."'8 0
We are dealing here with one basis point for the three-month LI-
BOR rate. As previously discussed in Part II(B) above, a one basis
point change in one billion U.S. dollars is the equivalent of $100,000
per annum.' 8 No doubt the damage calculation will be complex due
to daily submissions, the estimate nature of even non-manipulated LI-
BOR submissions, the amount involved, and the length of time but
that does not undermine the causation element.
Is this an antitrust injury? Counterparties under this scenario are
not alleging an injury due to increased competition, as in Brunswick.
174. In re Barclays PLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 32,234, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at
*5-10, *18-28 (June 27, 2012); Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 1 8-11, 52-101; State-
ment of Facts, supra note 13, at 5-15.
175. DeLong Equip. Co., 990 F.2d at 1198-99.
176. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1968).
177. See, e.g., Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2002).
178. HOVENKAMP, supra note 93, at 660.
179. Id.
180. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 12.
181. Das, Part 1, supra note 18.
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They are alleging an injury (lost profits) due to market manipulation
in violation of free market principles. As antitrust laws are designed
to protect free markets, 182 the injuries caused by LIBOR manipula-
tion would indeed be the type of injuries antitrust laws are intended to
prevent.
Similarly, the second period of LIBOR manipulation (around 2008
to at least 2010), where rates were manipulated down to give the ap-
pearance of a bank's financial stability during the peak of the eco-
nomic crisis, would cause recoverable damages to counterparties. The
misimpression given here, that everyone benefits from reduced inter-
est rates, is far from the truth. In fact, some of the hardest hit
counterparties during this period were state and local governments
investing in interest rate swaps.183
As to mortgagors who were the victims of LIBOR rates being
manipulated higher on the first of each month when the mortgage
rates readjusted, there is some evidence that LIBOR was manipulated
for this purpose in the Barclays Settlement documents 84 which, again,
would not be an injury due to increased competition as in Brunswick
but would be damages due to market manipulation and price fixing.
Finally, the court's decision in the In re LIBOR-Based Financial In-
struments Antitrust Litigation case is primarily based on insufficient
pleadings185 and the court's holding that the LIBOR submission pro-
cess is not competitive.186 The insufficient pleading problem may be
overcome by pending amendments, but the holding that the LIBOR
submission process is not competitive, hence no antitrust injury can be
alleged, eviscerates any possible civil antitrust action if the holding
withstands an appeal. The trial court's antitrust injury analysis in In re
LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation is deserving
of a separate article particularly if it is upheld on appeal. Such analy-
sis is beyond the scope of this Article. However, suffice it to say that,
even if it is required that the LIBOR submission process itself must be
competitive to allege an antitrust injury, one could make such an alle-
gation. Specifically, banks are selected as participating banks on the
panels based upon reputation, credit quality, and activity in
182. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 388 (1991); United States
v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); WALKER, supra note 159, at 3.
183. See, e.g., In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2262(NRB),
2011 WL 5007957 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011).
184. In re Barclays PLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 32,234, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at
*22-24 (June 27, 2012).
185. In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2262(NRB), 2013 WL
1285338, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2013).
186. Id. at *16, *19, *21.
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London.187 All of these are competitive factors to get on LIBOR
panels for prestige, market input and, evidently, the ability to manipu-
late the market for profit.
C. Intent Requirement in Criminal Actions
A criminal antitrust violation does not require damages but does
require the establishment of intent.188 The intent which must be es-
tablished in a criminal prosecution of Section 1 is that either the con-
duct had an anticompetitive effect and that defendants knew of these
probable effects or the conduct was intended to produce the anticom-
petitive effect and that the defendants knew of the probable effect.18 9
If the antitrust conduct is per se an unreasonable restraint of trade, as
is horizontal price fixing, then the only intent which must be estab-
lished is the intent to enter into the agreement as intent to produce
the anticompetitive effect and knowledge of the probable effect will
be presumed.190
D. Intent Analysis as Applied in the Barclays Settlement
Given the broad language in the Sherman Act and the complexity
of business practices, prosecutors and the courts have resorted to the
criminal sanctions in the Sherman Act only in cases where the conduct
was egregious. Horizontal price fixing is one of those cases.191 What
we have in the Barclays Settlement is a horizontal price-fixing case, so
the only intent that would be required would be the intent to enter
into the agreement to fix prices.192
For example, an exchange of pricing information among competi-
tors may evidence an improper Section 1 agreement but, without
more, lacks the requisite intent and purpose of criminal sanctions to
punish conscious and calculated wrongdoing.193 But in a price-fixing
187. See supra note 27.
188. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978).
189. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 445-46; United States v. Cinemette Corp. of Am., 687 F.
Supp. 976, 983 (W.D. Pa. 1988); HOVENKAMP, supra note 93, at 643.
190. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 & n.59 (1940); United
States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1161 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cargo Serv. Stations, Inc.,
657 F.2d 676, 683 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 28, 1981) ("Unlike the situation in Gypsum, in the
present case the district court did not require the jury to infer the requisite intent from a finding
that the exchange of price information had an impact on prices. Rather, the district court
equated the intent to fix prices with the requisite intent to unreasonably restrain commerce.");
HOVENKAMP, supra note 93, at 643-44.
191. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 439-40.
192. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224-25 & n.59; Gravely, 840 F.2d at 1161; HOVENKAMP,
supra note 93, at 634-44.
193. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 441-42.
323
324 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:291
case, if it is established that defendants intended to raise, depress, fix,
peg, or stabilize a price,19 4 it is not necessary to prove defendants in-
tended to violate antitrust laws.195 Do the emails referenced in the
Barclays Settlement documents evidence such intent to raise, depress,
fix, peg, or stabilize a price? The e-mails are, again, enlightening:
i. [O]n 22 March 2006, Trader A (a US dollar Derivatives
Trader) stated in an email to Manager A that Barclays' Sub-
mitter "submits our settings each day, we influence our settings
based on the fixings we all have".
ii. [O]n 5 February 2008, Trader B (a US dollar Derivatives
Trader) stated in a telephone conversation with Manager B
that Barclays' Submitter was submitting "the highest LIBOR
of anybody [ . .] He's like, I think this is where it should be.
I'm like, dude, you're killing us". Manager B instructed
Trader B to: "just tell him to keep it, to put it low". Trader B
said that he had "begged" the Submitter to put in a low LI-
BOR submission and the Submitter had said he would "see
what I can do" ....
58. Barclays' Derivative Traders would request high or low sub-
missions regularly in emails, for example on 7 February 2006,
Trader C (a US dollar Derivatives Trader) requested a "High
Im and high 3m if poss please. Have v. large 3m coming up for
the next 10 days or so". Trader C also expressed his preference
that Barclays would be "kicked out" of the average calculation.
Trader C's aim was therefore that Barclays' submissions would
be high enough to be excluded from the final average calcula-
tion, which could have affected the final benchmark rate.
i. Trader C stated "We have an unbelievably large set on Mon-
day (the IMM). We need a really low 3m fix, it could poten-
tially cost a fortune. Would really appreciate any help";
ii. Trader B explained "I really need a very very low 3m fixing
on Monday - preferably we get kicked out. We have about 80
yards [billion] fixing for the desk and each 0.1 [one basis
point] lower in the fix is a huge help for us. So 4.90 or lower
would be fantastic". Trader B also indicated his preference
that Barclays would be kicked out of the average calculation;
and
iii. On Monday, 13 March 2006, the following email exchange
took place:
194. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223.
195. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v.
Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Soc'y of Indep. Gasoline Marketers,
624 F.2d 461, 465 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 544-45 (3d Cir. 1979).
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Trader C: "The big day [has] arrived. . . My NYK are
screaming at me about an unchanged 3m li-
bor. As always, any help wd be greatly ap-
preciated. What do you think you'll go for
3m?"
Submitter: "I am going 90 altho 91 is what I should be
posting".
Trader C: "[ .. .] when I retire and write a book about
this business your name will be written in
golden letters [ . . ]".
Submitter: "I would prefer this [to] not be in any book!"
Submitter: "Hi All, Just as an FYI, I will be in noon'ish
on Monday [ . .
Trader B: "Noonish? Whos going to put my low fixings
in? hehehe"
Submitter: "[ ... ] [X or Y] will be here if you have any
requests for the fixings".
61. Trader D set calendar entries on at least 4 occasions in 2006 to re-
mind him to make requests for EURIBOR submissions: "Ask for
Low Reset Rate" and "Ask for High 6M Fix".
64. In response to a request from Trader C for a high one month and
low three month US dollar LIBOR submission on 16 March 2006, a
Submitter responded: "For you . .. anything. I am going to go 78
and 92.5. It is difficult to go lower than that in threes, looking at
where cash is trading. In fact, if you did not want a low one I would
have gone 93 at least".
65. Trader C requested low one month and three month US dollar LI-
BOR submissions at 10:52 am on 7 April 2006 (shortly before the
submissions were due to be made); "If it's not too late low Im and
3m would be nice, but please feel free to say "no". . . Coffees will be
coming your way either way, just to say thank you for your help in
the past few weeks". A Submitter responded "Done ... for you big
boy".
66. On 29 June 2006, a Submitter responded to Trader E's request for
EURIBOR submissions "with the offer side at 2.90 and 3.05 I will
input mine at 2.89 and 3.04 with you guys wanting lower fixings
(normally I would be a tick above the offer side)".
67. On 6 August 2007, a Submitter even offered to submit a US dollar
rate higher than that requested:
Trader F: "Pls set 3m libor as high as possible today"
Submitter: "Sure 5.37 okay?"
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Trader F: "5.36 is fine"196
It is difficult to anticipate what a court or jury would think of this
evidence. The DOJ tends to settle most of its criminal cases prior to
the litigation getting to the point of a publishable opinion. 197 Accord-
ingly, there is a dearth of clear examples of the nature and extent of
the intent requirement under Section 1. That said, neither fraud nor
corrupt scienter are required for a criminal conviction under Section
1198 but such evidence certainly would provide a stronger case. The
above referenced emails, which are only a portion of the emails in the
Barclays Settlement relevant to this issue, do evidence an intent to
raise, depress, fix, peg, or stabilize the LIBOR rates. Further, the
facts and evidence in the Barclays Settlement documents indicate
fraud and a corrupt scienter. This should be sufficient for the intent
requirement
V. THE GOVERNMENT MADE ME Do IT
One of the distractions raised by Barclays in the recent LIBOR ma-
nipulation scandal is that regulators (the government) encouraged
manipulation of the LIBOR rates starting in 2008 when the financial
crisis commenced.199 The reasons given for this manipulation during
the financial crisis are that the LIBOR rates are an indicator of bank
stability; an increase in a bank's interbank loan interest rate is an indi-
cation that that bank is not stable.2" Accordingly, regulators alleg-
edly suggested to banks, such as Barclays, that they report artificially
low LIBOR rates to prevent a run on a systemic bank. 201 While such
a public deception, if true, is very troubling, it is not a defense to a
civil nor a criminal antitrust action.
Defendants, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., unsuccess-
fully made a similar argument. 202 Socony-Vacuum involved a problem
in the petroleum market in the mid-1920s and into the 1930s. Over-
production caused prices to go down dramatically, and the deflation of
196. Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, 57-61, 64-67.
197. See, e.g., Workload Statistics: FY 2002-2011, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/workload-statistics.html (last visited May 17, 2013).
198. Eric Grannon & Nicolle Kownacki, Are Antitrust Violations Crimes Involving Moral Tur-
pitude?, THE CHAMPION, Apr. 2012, at 44-45.
199. In re Barclays PLC, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) T 32,234, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at
*23-64 (June 27, 2012); Final Notice to Barclays, supra note 13, $1 12-14, 102-45; Statement of
Facts, supra note 13, at 5-22; see also Das, Part 2, supra note 18.
200. In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at *23-64; Final Notice to Barclays, supra
note 13, 1[ 12-14, 102-45; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 15-22.
201. HC 481-i, supra note 9, at 17-21; see In re Barclays PLC, 2012 CFTC LEXIS 39, at
*54-62; Statement of Facts, supra note 13, at 20-22.
202. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
2013] LIBOR MANIPULATION AND ANTITRUST ALLEGATIONS
prices together with the economic troubles caused by the Great De-
pression gave both state and federal government concern. 203 At first
several states with a large petroleum industry attempted to pass laws
to limit production to stabilize prices. 204 When this did not work, the
federal government started to look into the problem. As part of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA),205 a "code of fair
competition for the petroleum industry" was established with the Sec-
retary of the Interior appointed as the Administrator.206 The Secre-
tary of the Interior created a Petroleum Administrative Board to
advise him and a Planning and Coordination Committee was ap-
pointed, with members from the petroleum industry. The Secretary of
the Interior approved plans that attempted to limit production, limit
supply, and bring prices up, but in 1935, the Supreme Court ruled that
the code of fair competition for the petroleum industry was unconsti-
tutional.207 After that, the government, through the Petroleum Ad-
ministrative Board, attempted to address the problem through
negotiating voluntary cooperative agreements between members in
the industry to limit production and stabilize prices. 208 Members of
the industry continued to meet even after the Supreme Court ruled
that the fair competition code making authority conferred in the
NIRA was unconstitutional. 209 Although there was some dispute re-
garding the outright approval of the government, the government did
seem to have knowledge of the ongoing industry attempts to stabilize
prices, and there is some evidence of government approval of such
conduct. 210 In holding that the government's knowledge or acquies-
cence did not provide antitrust immunity, the Court stated:
As to knowledge or acquiescence of officers of the Federal govern-
ment little need be said. The fact that Congress through utilization
of the precise methods here employed could seek to reach the same
objective sought by respondents does not mean that respondents or
any other group may do so without specific Congressional authority.
Admittedly no approval of the buying programs was obtained under
the National Industrial Recovery Act prior to its termination on
June 16, 1935, (§ 2(c)) which would give immunity to respondents
from prosecution under the Sherman Act. Though employees of
the government may have known of those programs and winked at
203. Id. at 170-71.
204. Id.
205. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195, 200.
206. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 171-72.
207. Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
208. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 174-75.
209. Id. at 175-90.
210. Id. at 201-08.
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them or tacitly approved them, no immunity would have thereby
been obtained. For Congress had specified the precise manner and
method of securing immunity. None other would suffice.211
In the case of LIBOR manipulation, there is no indication that the
United States Congress provided immunity, so even if there was tacit
approval from some regulators that would not provide immunity from
United States antitrust laws.
VI. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
Barclays and the other LIBOR panel banks which may be involved
in the LIBOR manipulation have an international presence both in
terms of causing an effect in many different countries and physical
presence. There is little doubt that these banks will face many civil
suits, if not criminal actions, around the globe.212 Accordingly, the
issue of the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law
may become an issue.2 13
Domestic (United States) victims of price fixing may bring a Section
1 claim based upon foreign anticompetitive conduct causing domestic
harm, but foreign victims may not for harm caused in foreign na-
tions.214 Thus, the LIBOR manipulation that occurred outside of the
United States will be subject to the extraterritorial application of Sec-
tion 1 only for the harm caused in the United States.215 Harm caused
in other nations will be subject to the competition laws of those na-
tions. To do otherwise would amount to unacceptable interference
with the commercial interests of other nations. 216
To the extent LIBOR manipulation was a compelled act for which
the banks had no choice but to obey, there may be a valid defense to a
Section 1 action as the acts of the banks effectively become sovereign
acts.217 But what we have to date is, at best, LIBOR manipulation
211. Id. at 222-27.
212. See Matt Scuffham, Barclays Faces Libor Claim in Landmark UK Court Case, REUTERS
(Oct. 24. 2012, 6:08 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/24/uk-barclays-libor-idUKBRE89
N14L20121024.
213. Certainly, the international aspect of this mess and the trillions of dollars involved guar-
antee political ramifications and possible conflicts between competition authorities around the
globe.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2006); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155
(2004).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 6(a); Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 155; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Califor-
nia, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
216. Hoffmann-La Roche, 542 U.S. at 164-65.
217. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 606 (1976), super-
seded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a). For the acts-of-state doctrine, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 400-01 (1964).
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during the financial crisis based upon foreign governmental approval
and/or involvement which does not provide a defense.218 Further,
principles of comity would not require deference to foreign govern-
ment approval and/or involvement for the LIBOR manipulation con-
duct particularly when such an outcome would, in effect, cede
domestic market control to a foreign state. 219
Additionally, United States banks, which were members of a LI-
BOR panel and are involved in LIBOR manipulation, may be subject
to extraterritorial application of other states competition laws.220 To
date it appears as though the regulatory authorities of the United
Kingdom and the United States are continuing to practice cooperation
and coordination regarding the LIBOR manipulation scandal-at
least on the banking regulations arena. But, European Union law will
also be applicable for the competition law violations221 that are cur-
rently under investigation.222 While it is too early to predict what will
happen, it is quite possible we will have conflicting outcomes based
more on economic and political considerations rather than the rule of
law.223
VII. CONCLUSION
The LIBOR manipulation scandal is but the latest of many banking
scandals that have come to the public light in the aftermath of the
financial crisis of 2008, but it is likely to be recorded in history as the
most consequential. Antitrust laws in the United States, as well as
anti-cartel laws in the rest of the world, are intended to prevent and
redress this type of conduct by powerful cartels. This anticompetitive
conduct undermines the free market and harms individuals, corpora-
tions, governments, and institutions. Further, the credibility of the
218. Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 606.
219. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 123-24 (1895).
220. See, e.g., Case 89/85, In re Wood Pulp Cartel, 1988 E.C.R. 5193. Currently, the following
United States banks are being investigated for LIBOR manipulation: Bank of America, Ci-
tigroup, and JP Morgan Chase. David McLaughlin, JPMorgan, UBS Said Among Banks Que-
ried in Libor Probe, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2012, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-08-15/jpmorgan-barclays-said-among-banks-to-get-libor-subpoenas.html; Son, supra note
48.
221. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.
222. Joaqufn Almunia, Vice President, European Comm'n Responsible for Competition Pol-
icy, Competition Enforcement in the Knowledge Economy (Sept. 20, 2012), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-12-629_en.htm; Sophie Mosca, Euribor and Libor
Probes a Priority for EU, EUROPOLITICS (July 2, 2012), http://www.europolitics.infolbusiness-
competitiveness/euribor-and-libor-probes-a-priority-for-eu-art338710-8.html.
223. For example, see the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger.
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markets and financial institutions is at an all-time low and continues to
sink with each new scandal.
To the historian, the financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession
aftermath give a strong sensation of d6jA vu. Financial crises in the
past have often been attributed to over speculation energized, in part,
by fraud, market manipulation and governmental assistance in creat-
ing a corrupt system.224 In commenting on the 1907 financial crisis,
Justice Brandeis observed:
The development of our financial oligarchy followed, in this re-
spect, lines with which the history of political despotism has famil-
iarized us:-usurpation, proceeding by gradual encroachment
rather than by violent acts; subtle and often long-concealed concen-
tration of distinct functions, which are beneficent when separately
administered, and dangerous only when combined in the same
persons. 225
These are not qualities of a free market. Yet, despite these and similar
observations over the years, antitrust laws, which are intended to pro-
tect free markets,226 are enforced less, not more, by the government in
times of economic turmoil.227 Perhaps this is because the government
has had little success in prosecuting such actions in the financial ser-
vices sector even after a crisis.228 In any event, based upon historical
patterns, there is little reason to expect a criminal action brought by
the United States against a systemic bank or a member of its upper
management. Redress will have to come from the civil actions. And
after governmental officials deliver their panegyric on the state re-
sponse to the LIBOR manipulation, the majority of people can find
comfort in the knowledge that "[laws are best explained, interpreted
and applied by those whose interest and abilities lie in perverting, con-
founding and eluding them." 229
224. See STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong. (2d Sess. 1934); CONCEN-
TRATION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT, H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong. (3d Sess. 1913);
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 132.
225. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 7 (Read a Classic 2011) (1932).
226. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 642 n.1 (1992); City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 388 (1991); City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389, 408 (1978).
227. Daniel A. Crane, Did We Avoid Historical Failures of Antitrust Enforcement During the
2008-2009 Financial Crisis?, 77 ANTrrRUST L.J. 219, 220-21 (2010).
228. See, for example, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), where the
government lost a case based upon Section 1 and numerous other causes of action. The action
arose from the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression resulting thereafter. De-
fendants were seventeen Wall Street investment banks. Id. at 624. Unlike the LIBOR manipu-
lation cases, the government's case involved a wide variety of conduct and was based entirely
upon circumstantial evidence.
229. Swwvr, supra note 1, at 129.
